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JURISDICTION

This matter was transferred to the Court of Appeals by the Utah Supreme Court
pursuant to

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-2-2(4). This Court has Jurisdiction to decide

appellants' appeal pursuant to

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-2-2(3)0).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1.

Issue: Did the trial court err in dismissing the complaint?
Standard of Review: Whether dismissal of the complaint is

appropriate is a matter of law, reviewed under a correction of error standard.
Republic Health Corp. v. Lifemark Hospitals of Florida, Inc., 755 F.2d 1453, 1454
(11th Cir. 1985) ("[T]he appropriate standard of review is whether the district
court erred as a matter of law in dismissing appellant's complaint pursuant to
Rule 13(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Citing Xerox Corp. v. SCM
Corp., 576 F.2d 1057, 1058 n. 1 (3d Cir.1978).
2.

Issue: Did the trial court err in refusing to order consolidation?
Standard of Review: Whether consolidation is appropriate is a

matter of discretion, and would therefore be reviewed under an abuse of
discretion standard. See Lignell v. Berg, 593 P.2d 800, 806 (Utah 1979) ("The
authority to consolidate actions for trial is provided by the rules in the interests of
efficient judicial administration. As is true of any other kind of judicial discretion, it
is subject to abuse, and it is appropriate for us to remand for separate trials if it
appears the prejudice to any litigant, from consolidation, far outweighed the
benefit.").

1

APPLICABLE STATUTES AND RULES

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, discrimination 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e,
etseq.\ see Addendum 2.
42 U.S.C. § 1981; see Addendum 3.
Utah's Anti-Discrimination Act,
Addendum 4.
UTAH

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 34A-5-106; see

R. CIV. P. 12. Defenses and objections:
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief
in any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or
third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading
thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses may at
the option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3)
improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of
service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted, (7) failure to join an indispensable party. A motion
making any of these defenses shall be made before pleading if a
further pleading is permitted. No defense or objection is waived by
being joined with one or more other defenses or objections in a
responsive pleading or motion or by further pleading after the
denial of such motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim
for relief to which the adverse party is not required to serve a
responsive pleading, the adverse party may assert at the trial any
defense in law or fact to that claim for relief. If, on a motion
asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the
pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters
outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the
court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment
and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be
given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent
to such a motion by Rule 56.

UTAH

R. CIV. P. 13(a), Compulsory Counterclaims:
A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the
time of serving the pleading the pleader has against any opposing
party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject-matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require
for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court
2

cannot acquire jurisdiction. But the pleader need not state the claim
if (1) at the time the action was commenced the claim was the
subject of another pending action, or (2) the opposing party brought
suit upon his claim by attachment or other process by which the
court did not acquire jurisdiction to render a personal judgment on
that claim, and the pleader is not stating any counterclaim under
this Rule 13.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case.

This is a discrimination case, brought under two federal discrimination statutes,1
for employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
discrimination 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, etseq. ("Title VII") and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and for
discriminatory interference with protected activities under contracts Plaintiff and
Appellant Jamal S. Yanaki ("Yanaki"), who is undisputably a member of a protected
class, was employed by Defendant from 1992 to and through January 17, 2002. At all
times during his employment, Yanaki was a party to a written employment contract as
part of which he agreed that, during his employment, and continuing after the
termination of his employment, Yanaki would not disclose "confidential information" that
belonged to lomed.2 In or about April, 1999, Yanaki's benefits package at lomed was
changed, to include reimbursement for part of the expense of attending the Executive
MBA program at the University of Utah. In February 2000, that benefit was modified, to
cover 100% of Yanaki's expense in attending the program and elimination any

1

Yanaki also filed under the state of Utah's Anti-Discrimination Act,

ANN.§34A-5-106.
2

The "IP Agreement."
3

UTAH CODE

reimbursement requirement from Yanaki to lomed should Yanaki's employment
terminate.3 Other, non-protected class employees of lomed were subject to identical IP
Agreements and had substantially similar MBA Benefit Contracts (the "similarly-situated
employees").
Prior to Yanaki's departure, certain of the similarly-situated employees left
lomed's employment and worked in industry positions competitive to lomed, but lomed
took no action under its contracts with those similarly-situated employees. After
Yanaki's departure, however, when lomed's then-Chief Operating Officer, now Chief
Executive Officer, Lollini, and its Human Resources Director, Crowther, discovered that
Yanaki, like the similarly-situated employees, was employed in an industry position that
could be competitive with lomed, lomed sought to enforce provisions it had not sought
to enforce against the other employees, and filed suit against Yanaki on April 10, 2002,
in the Third District Court, Case No. 020903031 (the "Third District Action").
Yanaki, viewing the selective effort to take action against him, alone, when
lomed made no effort to take action against the similarly-situated employees who left
and competed against lomed, was based on a discriminatory animus against him, due
to his membership in a protected class, pursued his mandatory administrative remedies
by filing a charge of discrimination with the Utah Anti-Discrimination and Labor Division
("UALD") and the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"),
on September 9, 2002, UALD No. A2-0836 and EEOC No. 35C-A2-0836. lomed
answered the charge of discrimination on October 17, 2002 (the "Discrimination

3

The MBA Benefit Contract.
4

Action").
Yanaki filed a counterclaim in the Third District Court action, Case No.
020903031, on January 15, 2003, under the IP Agreement, against lomed, for its
breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in
hindering Yanaki's right to engage in competitive employment, and against lomed,
Lollini, Crowther and another party, for defamation in the accusations that Yanaki had
stolen lomed's confidential information. Yanaki was legally incapable of filing his
discrimination action, because he had not yet received his prerequisite "right to sue
letter."
The deadline to amend pleadings in the Third District Court action was February
27, 2003. No judgment has been entered in the Third District Court action, and that
action remains pending. Yanaki's "right to sue letter" was issued by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission on March 26, 2003, and Yanaki timely filed his
Complaint herein within 90 days thereafter, on June 24, 2003.
B.

Course of Proceedings.

Yanaki filed a charge of discrimination with the Utah Anti-Discrimination and
Labor Division and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, on September 9,
2002, UALD No. A2-0836 and EEOC No. 35C-A2-0836. Yanaki exhausted his
administrative remedies and his "right to sue letter" was issued by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission on March 26, 2003. Yanaki timely filed his
Complaint herein within 90 days after issuance of his "right to sue letter," on June 24,
2003.
Defendants/Appellees moved to dismiss this action, not citing to
5

UTAH

R. CIV. P.

12, governing defenses asserted by motion, but instead, citing to

UTAH

R. CIV. P. 13 (a),

which governs the assertion of compulsory counterclaims. The motion was briefed by
the parties and argued on December 5, 2003. On January 5, 2004, the trial court
entered its minute entry decision that the action was "inextricably intertwined" with the
pending Third District Court action. Rather than ordering consolidation, and
presumably treating the motion as one brought under Rule 12(b)(6), the trial court
ordered that the entire action be dismissed without prejudice. A written form of order
effectuating such minute entry decision was entered herein on February 10, 2004,
thereby disposing of the entire action by way of a dismissal, without prejudice.
C.

Disposition By Trial Court.

The trial court dismissed this action, in its entirety, without prejudice, on February
10,2004.
STATEMENT OF FACTS 4

1.

In or about September, 1992, Yanaki was hired as an employee by defendant
and appellee lomed, Inc. ("lomed"), and was required to sign the same form of
written employment agreement, entitled "Intellectual Property and Invention
Agreement" that all other lomed employees were required to sign ("IP
Agreement"). R. 12-13. The IP Agreement prohibited Yanaki from disclosing
any lomed Intellectual Property. The IP Agreement expressly allowed Yanaki,
however, to leave his employment with lomed, and to compete with lomed in his

4

The facts set forth below that are taken from the Complaint herein must be
taken as true for purposes of reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal. See Coleman v.
Utah State Land Board, 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990).
6

new employment, so long as he did not make use of lomed trade secrets or
confidential information as part of his competition. R.2-3.
2.

In or about April, 1999, Yanaki's benefits package at lomed was modified to
include reimbursement for part of the expense of attending courses in the
Executive MBA program at the University of Utah. R . 3.

3.

In or about January, 2000, Yanaki was contemplating leaving his employment at
lomed to accept a position at another company that had offered to reimburse
him fully for his Executive MBA expenses. Yanaki's direct supervisor, Tim Miller
("Miller"), an lomed Executive Vice President, and corporate officer, with
authority from lomed, on February, 9, 2000, as the result of negotiations with
Yanaki and lomed's then-acting CEO, James Weersing ("Weersing"), offered
Yanaki a promotion and a new benefits package. That offer was co-signed by
Crowther, although she had no part in, and no knowledge of the details of, the
negotiations with Yanaki. R. 3.

4.

The offer did not include a provision, as had Yanaki's prior benefits package,
requiring Yanaki to repay any portion of the Executive MBA program benefit to
lomed if he departed his employment In this regard, Yanaki specifically
negotiated a new benefits contract with terms and conditions similar to non-Arab
ethnic origin lomed-employee benefit packages concerning the Executive MBA
program ("MBA Benefit Contract") (R. 14) that did not require pay back. R. 3.

5.

Yanaki accepted the offer and stayed at lomed for the specific reasons that he
was promoted to general manager of lomed' s commercial business division,
given the title "General Manager and Vice President of Commercial Business"
7

and given the MBA Benefit Contract with no requirement of payback if he left
lomed. Yanaki never received another promotion at lomed after Miller, who had
been responsible for all of Yanaki's promotions at lomed, left lomed. R. 3-4.
6.

After Miller's termination from the corporate office of Executive Vice President of
lomed' s Inflammation Division, in approximately July, 2001, Yanaki was not
promoted to that position although he was interested, qualified and available.
Instead, Weersing, the then-CEO, took over those responsibilities, and Yanaki
began reporting directly to Weersing. Lollini, however, was in charge of
bonuses, and gave Yanaki's subordinate, Tim Lucas ("Lucas"), a larger bonus
than he gave Yanaki. R. 4.

7.

After Weersing's termination in early November, 2001, Yanaki again was not
promoted to Miller's position as a corporate officer in charge of the Inflammation
Division, but Lollini took over those duties, and Yanaki began to report directly to
Lollini.

8.

Peter Wardle ("Wardle"), lomed's Chairman of the Board of Directors, came to
Salt Lake City in early November, 2001, and announced that Lollini was in
charge. Yanaki was told by Lollini to drive Wardle to the airport. On that
occasion, Wardle asked Yanaki where he was from and what religion he was.
Wardle asked Yanaki if Lollini was the right choice for Chief Operating Officer.
Yanaki expressed his disappointment that, although he had been interested,
qualified and available, he had not been considered for the position. R. 4.

9.

After Lollini took over the day to day operations of lomed, Yanaki inquired
whether Lollini would consider asking the Board of Directors to promote him to
8

the corporate officer position of Executive Vice President. Lollini informed
Yanaki that he planned to make Greg Fischer ("Fischer") Executive Vice
President. Yanaki informed Lollini that Fischer had inquired of Yanaki earlier that
year what religion Yanaki was, implying that Yanaki was Muslim, and that Yanaki
had not appreciated that comment. Yanaki also informed Lollini that Fischer did
not have the background or experience to justify elevating him to that position,
especially since Fischer had been at lomed only one year, when Yanaki had
been at lomed nine years and had more experience than Fischer. Lollini told
Yanaki that his decision was final. Yanaki believes that Fischer was in fact given
that position. R. 4-5
After that conversation between Yanaki and Lollini, Yanaki was subjected to
other comments about his ethnic origin. In the end of November, 2001, Lollini
said to Yanaki: 'They found bin Laden" and showed Yanaki a printout of a
picture of Osama bin Laden behind the sales counter at a 7-Eleven. Lollini
commented: "He looks like you, only with a beard." Lollini then laughed. R. 5.
In December, 2001, Yanaki was offered an opportunity to (1) consult for two
companies, JRW Technologies and Ceramatec, Inc., that were interested in
pursuing development of existing Ceramatec, Inc. technology similar to a product
that had been placed on the market earlier that year by a company called Birch
Point Medical, and (2) possibly obtain part ownership of a new company to be
spun off from Ceramatec that would hold that technology and other technologies.
Lollini had already informed Yanaki that lomed was not going to investigate the
Birch Point product, which was a remarkable departure from the traditional
9

iontophoresis products that lomed produced. R. 5.
12.

Because Yanaki was suffering health problems due to stress in the corporate
environment at lomed, including Wardle and Lollini' s expressed attitudes toward
his ethnic origin and plan to promote the less-qualified, but non-Arab, Fischer
instead of him, and because Yanaki was desirous of another opportunity such as
what he was presented, Yanaki tendered a written resignation and provided two
weeks' notice to lomed, on January 2, 2002. R. 5.

13.

Lollini accepted Yanaki's resignation on January 5, 2002. Lollini then arranged
an announcement that Yanaki was leaving. Lucas participated in the
announcement by telephone. R. 5.

14.

After Lollini made the announcement, an lomed employee commented on
Yanaki's beard that he had recently grown. At that point, Lucas stated that
Yanaki "looked like a Taliban." Lollini and Crowther laughed. R. 6.

15.

A few days later, another lomed employee, Stacey Robinson, referred to Yanaki
as "bin Leaving" in front of Lollini, Crowther and others. Lollini and Crowther
again laughed. R. 6.

16.

Whatever resentments lomed employees may have harbored against Arabs after
September 11, 2001, when Lollini took over management, he and others felt free
to make disparaging comments in front of, and referencing, Yanaki, concerning
his ethnic origin, and to laugh about them. R. 6

17.

During Yanaki' s exit interview at lomed, Yanaki expressly affirmed that he would
abide by the terms of the IP Agreement. No one at that time mentioned any
belief that Yanaki would owe any money to Joined under the MBA Benefit

10

Contract for leaving Joined within one year after completing his Executive MBA
program. R. 6.
18.

Yanaki's final day of employment at lomed was January 17,2002. On that day,
Yanaki advised Crowther that he intended to compete with lomed, as allowed by
the IP Agreement, by working on investigating the possibility of doing a Birch
Point product knockoff. Crowther made no mention that she believed monies
would be owing to Joined under the MBA Benefit Contract. R. 6.

19.

After Yanaki departed lomed, Lollini called Yanaki on February 5,2002, indicating
that he had received an e-mail disclosing that Yanaki was competing with lomed.
Lollini asked whether Weersing or a company called Cerarnatec were involved,
and Yanaki told Lollini that he could not discuss his new business relations, but
that he was operating as a consultant in his new business. R. 6.

20.

Crowther sent a letter to Yanaki after he left employment demanding
reimbursement to Joined for Executive MBA expenses under the MBA Benefit
Contract, despite the fact that such agreement was the same as agreements
other lomed employees who did not have Arab ethnic origin had, and contained
no provision requiring such reimbursement. The transmittal of such letter to
Yanaki concerning that portion of his employment contract represented by the
MBA Benefit Contract constitutes, inter alia, a continuation of the ethnic-origin
based harassment that was prevalent under Lollini' s oversight of lomed. R. 6-7.

21.

lomed then filed the Third District action against Yanaki, claiming Yanaki
breached the IP Agreement, although lomed did not file suit against Weersing,
and did not file suit against any other lomed employee who had left lomed in the

11

past and competed. None of those employees had Arab ethnic origins. The
filing of suit against Yanaki concerning the portion of his employment contract
represented by the IP Agreement constitutes, inter alia, a continuation of the
ethnic-origin based harassment and retaliation that was prevalent under Lollini's
oversight of lomed. R. 7.
22.

Yanaki then filed, on September 9, 2002, an administrative claim with the UALD
of the State of Utah, and the EEOC of the United States of America, alleging
discrimination. R. 7.

23.

After that administrative claim was filed, Lollini and Crowther, knowing about the
claim and in an effort to cover-up their discriminatory animus and lomed's
high-level policy or practice of discrimination against Yanaki as a person of Arab
ethnic origin, each lied under oath in their depositions in the Third District action
and denied having heard any person refer to Yanaki as a Taliban. R. 7.

24.

Defendants/Appellees at no time raised the defense of compulsory counterclaim
in the UALD and EEOC administrative proceedings. R. 170.

25.

Yanaki filed a counterclaim in the Third District Court action, Case No.
020903031, on January 15, 2003, under the IP Agreement, against lomed, for its
breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing in hindering Yanaki's right to engage in competitive employment, and
against lomed, Lollini, Crowther and another party, for defamation in the
accusations that Yanaki had stolen lomed's confidential information. R. USUS. Yanaki was at that time legally incapable of filing his discrimination action,
because he had not yet received his prerequisite "right to sue letter." R. 15.

12

26.

Lollini and Crowther were not parties plaintiff in the Third District Court action, as
to whom any compulsory counterclaim requirement could apply. R. 42.

27.

The scheduling deadline for amendment of pleadings in the Third District Court
action was February 27, 2003, at which time Yanaki had not yet exhausted his
administrative remedies and at which time he had not yet received his "right to
sue letter." Judicial Notice of Court files and R. 30, 168.

28.

Only after Yanaki filed his discrimination claims herein, including allegations of
proof of discrimination by virtue of the non-filing against Weersing, did lomed sue
Weersing, in yet another effort to cover-up its discriminatory animus and actions
against Yanaki as alleged in Yanaki's claim. R. 7.

29.

Yanaki exhausted his administrative remedies and was issued a right to sue
letter by the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on March
26, 2003 (R. 15), which was received by Yanaki through the United States mails
on a later date. R. 8.

30.

Both Defendants/Appellees and Yanaki proposed the remedy of an order of
consolidation in their memoranda below. R. 39 (Defendants/Appellees' Opening
Memorandum), R. 168 (Yanaki Opposition Memorandum), R. 211-212
(Defendants/Appellees' Reply Memorandum. The trial court offered no rationale
for its rejection of such remedy, which would have preserved all of Yanaki's
rights.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Yanaki's case should not have been dismissed, because: (1) Lollini and
Crowther were not plaintiffs asserting a claim against Yanaki in the Third District Court

13

action, and therefore Rule 13(a) does not apply to claims against them; (2) Yanaki's for
discrimination are not dependent upon whether any breach of contract did or did not
exist, so they cannot arise out of the same transactions and occurrences as lomed's
breach of contract and theft of trade secret claims, so Rule 13(a) is inapplicable; (3)
Yanaki's Title VII claims had not matured when he served his answer and counterclaim
in the Third District Court action, so Rule 13(a) is inapplicable; (4) lomed waived any
Rule 13(a) defense by failing to assert it before the UALD and EEOC in administrative
proceedings; and (5) consolidation, not dismissal, was the appropriate remedy to avoid
prejudice to Yanaki from the procedural posture of the Third District action, namely, that
the deadline to amend had passed; because both sides in their memoranda concede
that consolidation would be appropriate relief, and because the amendment cutoff had
passed in the Third District Court action, thereby causing prejudice to Yanaki if a
dismissal were ordered, it was an abuse of discretion not to order consolidation,
particularly given the trial court's finding that the claims were so intertwined with the
Third District Court action.
ARGUMENT
I.

LOLLINI AND CROWTHER W E R E NOT PLAINTIFFS IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
ACTION; T H U S RULE 13(a)

COULD N O T AFFORD T H E M A BASIS FOR DISMISSAL

HERE, UNDER A N Y CIRCUMSTANCES.
U T A H R . CIV.

P. 13(a) states:

A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the
time of serving the pleading the pleader has against any
opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence
that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and
does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of
whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.
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Id. (emphasis added). Neither Lollini nor Crowther were "opposing parties" who had
asserted "the opposing party's claim" against Yanaki in the Third District Court action.
By the unambiguous language of the rule, Yanaki is, under all circumstances, free to
assert his independent discrimination claims against Lollini and Crowther in an
independent forum, as he has done in this action, since they were not parties plaintiff
asserting any claims in the Third District action.
While consolidation of those separate claims may effectuate a judicial economy,
the trial court rejected that remedy, even neither side opposed the notion of
consolidation of this action with the Third District Court action. In any event, the trial
court's ruling is plainly erroneous as to the claims asserted against Lollini and Crowther,
who were not plaintiffs in the Third District Court action, and that portion of the ruling
dismissing claims against Lollini and Crowther plainly should be reversed and the case
remanded for further proceedings.
II.

T H E DISMISSAL O F CLAIMS AGAINST IOMED SHOULD B E REVERSED.

A.

Yanaki's Discrimination Claims Arise Out of the Disparate Treatment
of Yanaki, As Opposed To Other, Similarly-Situated Individuals, In
Singling Him Out For Allegations of Contract Breaches, Regardless
of Whether Allegations Of Contract Breaches Are Supportable.

The transactions and occurrences alleged in this action deal with pleaded acts of
(1) discrimination during Yanaki's employment, (2) discrimination in lomed's conduct in
seeking to enforce its confidentiality agreement against Yanaki in the manner it has
chosen to do so, when it has not enforced the agreement against other, similarly
situated ex-employees, and (3) discriminatory retaliation against Yanaki, postemployment, for asserting his federally-protected rights.
15

Yanaki's allegations in this case do not involve any alleged breach of the
confidentiality agreement, or the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing therein,
or breach of the MBA Benefit Contract. Indeed, whether lomed breached those
agreements, or whether Yanaki breached them, is immaterial to any resolution of
Yanaki's claims herein. Instead, regardless of whether there is, or is not, any breach,
other, similarly-situated ex-employees with identical or substantially-similar fact
situations to Yanaki, have not been singled out for action by lomed. Yanaki's
discrimination claim would therefore exist regardless of whether another Court would
find a breach-the claims herein compare lomed's conduct in proceeding against Yanaki
with its conduct against other, similarly situated ex-employees, and alleges that the
differences in treatment are derived from a discriminatory animus that is based on race,
ethnic origin and retaliation.
None of those issues are factually related to the Third District Court action's
claims of breach of contract or theft of confidential information. Likewise, this action
does not assert claims of breach of the MBA Benefit Contract, but rather, of
discrimination by lomed pursuing claims against Yanaki when it has not done so
against other, similarly situated ex-employees with such benefit agreements.
As such, Rule 13(a) governing compulsory counterclaims is not even implicated,
because it requires a counterclaim only "if it arises out of the same transaction or
occurrence that is the subject-matter of the opposing party's claim. . . ."

UTAH

R. CIV. P.

13(a). In a case on point, the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York held that theft of proprietary information-based claims asserted by an
employer were not compulsory counterclaims in a Title VII action, because such claims
16

are not "logically related" to discrimination claims under Title VII. See Spencer v. Banco
Real, 623 F. Supp. 1008, 1011-12 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
Put simply, the issues here involve facts surrounding defendants' discriminatory
animus against due to his race and ethnic origin and their disparate treatment of
Yanaki, as opposed to similarly situated lomed ex-employees, not whether trade
secrets were in fact stolen or agreements in fact breached. Most of the factual issues
in this case surround lomed's treatment of similarly situated ex-employees, and
discovery relating to proof of discriminatory animus, something that has nothing
whatsoever to do with lomed's theft of trade secret case.
Also, lomed has joined multiple parties to its trade secret litigation since
commencing it, who have nothing to do with the discrete allegations of discrimination
asserted in this case. Combining the claims would be an undue burden to those parties
and be unduly complicating to the jury deciding the trade secret issues. Where
counterclaims are permissive and not mandatory, the rules provide Yanaki with the
option of litigating them separately where it makes sense to do so, as it clearly does
here.
B.

Claims That Mature After the Filing of A Counterclaim Are Not
Compulsory Counterclaims.

Yanaki's Title Vll claims are expressly not included in the compulsory
counterclaim requirement by the language of the rule itself, because Yanaki did not, at
the time of filing his answer, have a mature claim to assert. See

UTAH

R. CIV. P. 13(a):

"A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of serving the
pleading {he pleader has against any opposing party, . . .[emphasis added]." Yanaki's
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claim had not matured, and was not assertable, until Yanaki received his right to sue
letter, after March 26, 2003.5
This exception to the compulsory counterclaim requirement in this case is
undisputable: "The first exception [to the compulsory counterclaim requirement] is that a
party need not assert a counterclaim that has not matured at the time he serves his
pleading." 6 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller and Mary Kay Kane,
AND PROCEDURE,

FEDERAL PRACTICE

§ 1411, at 80 (2d ed. 1990)(emphasis added) [hereinafter "Wright &

Miller"]. The facts set forth above show that the last pleading served by Yanaki in the
Third District Court action was served on January 10, 2003, almost three months before
Yanaki had a claim that could be asserted. Thus, by the plain language of the rule, the
claim was not compulsory.
This result is further buttressed by

UTAH

R. CIV. P. 13(e) which states: "A claim

which either matured or was acquired by the pleader after serving his pleading may,
with the permission of the court, be presented as a counterclaim by supplemental
pleading." Id. FED. R. CIV. P. 13(e) is verbatim the Utah rule. See FED. R. CIV. P. 13(e).
There is simply no question that such claims are not subject to any bar by virtue of Rule
13(a):
However, Rule 13(e) is permissive in character. An after-acquired
claim, even if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is
the subject matter of the opposing party's claim, need not be
pleaded supplementally; the after-acquired claim is not
considered a compulsory counterclaim under Rule 13(a) and a

5

Yanaki's claim under the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act likewise had not matured
until that time, because no agency action was taken until the right to sue letter issued.
The UALD had simply deferred to the EEOC, without issuing either a finding of cause or
no cause.
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failure to interpose it will not bar its assertion in a later suit
Wright & Miller § 1428, at 208-09 (emphasis added).
Yanaki had not exhausted his administrative remedies and until his "right to sue
letter" was issued on about March 26, 2003 (R. 15), which was received by Yanaki
through the United States mails on a later date. R. 8. See, e.g., Steinerv. Henderson,
354 F.3d 432, 437 (6th Cir. 2003)("lt is only after these procedures have been
exhausted and the plaintiff has received a "right-to-sue" letter, that she may pursue a
claim in federal court."); 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5.
C.

lomed Waived Any Compulsory Counterclaim Issue When It Failed
To Raise It Before The Administrative Agencies.

lomed did not raise any defense of "compulsory counterclaim" in the
administrative proceedings before the UALD or EEOC. Since the defense, if
cognizable at all under the circumstances, would be effective before the administrative
agencies, the failure of lomed to assert the defense should be deemed to be a waiver.
Indeed, this action may properly be considered to be, in effect, the judicial continuation
of the same claims, following the exhaustion of administrative remedies.
The trial court should not be in a position to review a defense that should have
been raised before the administrative agency, any differently than claims required to be
exhausted administratively. This is because, by failing to raise the defenses before the
agency, lomed failed to exhaust its own administrative remedies, and should have been
barred from raising the issue in the trial court, below. Cf. Harbison v. Goldschmidt, 693
F.2d 115, 118 (10th Cir. 1985)("The consistency as to issues or claims in the agency
and the court is also an aspect of the required exhaustion of administrative remedies
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which is treated as a jurisdictional matter [emphasis added].")
III.

RATHER THAN DISMISS, THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE ORDERED
CONSOLIDATION.

All other things being equal, if the trial court did not commit reversible error in its
determination that Rule 13(a) prevented any, or all, of Yanaki's claims from going
forward in this independent action, then the trial court should have ordered this action to
be consolidated into the pending Third District Court action, rather than dismissing it.
This is true because an order of consolidation would protect all of Yanaki's rights,
as well as allow the trial judge in the Third District Court action to determine whether
these claims of Yanaki should proceed under a separate schedule. The order of
dismissal entered herein, even though without prejudice, subjects Yanaki to the
possibility of irreversible prejudice if the trial judge in the Third District Court action
refused to allow amendment (the deadline having passed before Yanaki's Title VII
claims became ripe) or intervention (which might require a re-scheduling of existing
matters). With a consolidation, the trial judge in the Third District Court action would be
entirely free to have the consolidated cases proceed with their claims on bifurcated
tracks, if he felt that was the wise course for his own case management.
Since all parties expressed amenability to consolidation, the trial court should
have avoided any conceivable prejudice to Yanaki, in light of the procedural status of
the existing Third District Court action, precluding amendment, to order consolidation,
instead.
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the order of dismissal should be reversed entirely,
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remand with directions to order consolidation with the Third District Court action
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this
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day of November, 2004.
PETERS SCOFIELD PRICE
A Professional Corporation

I. SCOFIELD

Attorneys for the Appellant Jamal S. Yanaki

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JAMAL YANAKI,
Plaintiff,

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION
TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE

vs.
IOMED, INC., a Utah corporation;
ROBERT J. LOLLINI and MARY
CROWTHER,

Civil No. 030914206
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

Defendants.

On January 5,2004, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss with. Prejudice came before this
Court, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick presiding. Plaintiff was represented by Roger H. HooI.e
of Hoole & King, L,C and Defendants were represented by Clark Waddoups and Jonathan O.
Hafen of Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & Loveless. The Court, having reviewed the parties'
written submissions, having considered arguments of the parties, and being otherwise informed
in the premises, ORDERS as follows:

1•

The PJaintiff s Complaint is dismissed without prejudice for the reasons stated in
the Court's Minute Entry dated January 6,2004; and

2.

Defendants1 request for attorneys*' fees is denied,

DATED this mV day of S t r a y ' 2004,
BY TPfcfe COURT;

DisttiqCourtTudgi
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

HOOLE&KING.L.C.

Roger RHoole
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Dated this
day of January, 2004.
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS

Clark Waddoups
Attorneys for Defendants
Dated this 2&*&N of January, 2004.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
L ,d day
a v of January, 2004,1 caused a. true and correct copy
I hereby certify that on t hiiss^^/A
of tbe foregoing ORDER ON DEFEND ANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE to be served,
via facsimile and U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the following:
Roger H. Hoole
HOOLE & KINO LC

4276 So. Highland Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124-2634
(fax no. 272-7557)
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ADDENDUM 2

ADDENDUM 2 - TITLE VII
(42U.S.C. §20003, et seq.)

42 U.S.C. § 2000e
UNITED STATES CODE ANNOTATED
TITLE 42. THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE
CHAPTER 21—CIVIL RIGHTS
SUBCHAPTER VI--EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES
§ 2000e. Definitions
For the purposes of this subchapter(a) The term "person" includes one or more individuals, governments, governmental agencies, political
subdivisions, labor unions, partnerships, associations, corporations, legal representatives, mutual
companies, joint-stock companies, trusts, unincorporated organizations, trustees, trustees in cases under
Title 11, or receivers.
(b) The term "employer" means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or
more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or
preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person, but such term does not include (1) the United
States, a corporation wholly owned by the Government of the United States, an
Indian tribe, or any department or agency of the District of Columbia subject by statute to procedures of
the competitive service (as defined in section 2102 of Title 5), or (2) a bona fide private membership club
(other than a labor organization) which is exempt from taxation under section 501 (c) of Title 26, except
that during the first year after March 24, 1972, persons having fewer than twenty-five employees (and their
agents) shall not be considered employers.
(c) The term "employment agency" means any person regularly undertaking with or without compensation
to procure employees for an employer or to procure for employees opportunities to work for an employer
and includes an agent of such a person.
(d) The term "labor organization" means a labor organization engaged in an industry affecting commerce,
and any agent of such an organization, and includes any organization of any kind, any agency, or
employee representation committee, group, association, or plan so engaged in which employees
participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning
grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours, or other terms or conditions of employment, and
any conference, general committee, joint or system board, or joint council so engaged which is
subordinate to a national or international labor organization.
(e) A labor organization shall be deemed to be engaged in an industry affecting commerce if (1) it
maintains or operates a hiring hall or hiring office which procures employees for an employer or procures
for employees opportunities to work for an employer, or (2) the number of its members (or, where it is a
labor organization composed of other labor organizations or their representatives, if the aggregate number
of the members of such other labor organization) is (A) twenty-five or more during the first year after
March 24, 1972, or (B) fifteen or more thereafter, and such labor organization(1) is the certified representative of employees under the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act,
as amended [29 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq.], or the Railway Labor Act, as amended [45 U.S.C.A. § 151 et
seq.];
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(2) although not certified, is a national or international labor organization or a local labor organization
recognized or acting as the representative of employees of an employer or employers engaged in an
industry affecting commerce; or
(3) has chartered a local labor organization or subsidiary body which is representing or actively seeking to
represent employees of employers within the meaning of paragraph (1) or (2); or
(4) has been chartered by a labor organization representing or actively seeking to represent employees
within the meaning of paragraph (1) or (2) as the local
or subordinate body through which such employees may enjoy membership or become affiliated with such
labor organization; or
(5) is a conference, general committee, joint or system board, or joint council subordinate to a national or
international labor organization, which includes a labor organization engaged in an industry affecting
commerce within the meaning of any of the preceding paragraphs of this subsection.
(f) The term "employee" means an individual employed by an employer, except that the term "employee"
shall not include any person elected to public office in any State or political subdivision of any State by the
qualified voters thereof, or any person chosen by such officer to be on such officer's personal staff, or an
appointee on the policy making level or an immediate adviser with respect to the exercise of the
constitutional or legal powers of the office. The exemption set forth in the preceding sentence shall not
include employees subject to the civil service laws of a State government, governmental agency or
political subdivision. With respect to employment in a foreign country, such term includes an individual
who is a citizen of the United States.
(g) The term "commerce" means trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, transmission, or communication
among the several States; or between a State and any place outside thereof; or within the District of
Columbia, or a possession of the United States; or between points in the same State but through a point
outside thereof.
(h) The term "industry affecting commerce" means any activity, business, or industry in commerce or in
which a labor dispute would hinder or obstruct commerce or the free flow of commerce and includes any
activity or industry "affecting commerce" within the meaning of the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1959 [29 U.S.C.A. § 401 et seq.], and further includes any governmental industry,
business, or activity.
(i) The term "State" includes a State of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin
Islands, American Samoa, Guam, Wake Island, the Canal Zone, and Outer Continental Shelf lands
defined in the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act [43 U.S.C.A. § 1331 et seq.].
(j) The term "religion" includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless
an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee's or prospect1/e
employee's religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's
business.
(k) The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not limited to, because of or on the
basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth,
or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including
receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their
ability or inability to work, and nothing in section 2000e-2(h) of this title shall be interpreted to permit
otherwise. This subsection shall not require an employer to pay for health insurance benefits for abortion,
except where the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term, or excect where
medical complications have arisen from an abortion: Provided, That nothing herein shall preclude an
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employer from providing abortion benefits or otherwise affect bargaining agreements in regard to abortion.
(I) The term "complaining party" means the Commission, the Attorney General, or a person who may bring
an action or proceeding under this subchapter.
(m) The term "demonstrates" means meets the burdens of production and persuasion.
(n) The term "respondent" means an employer, employment agency, labor organization, joint
labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining program, including
an on-the-job training program, or Federal entity subject to section 2000e-16 of this title.

3

42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-1
UNITED STATES CODE ANNOTATED
TITLE 42. THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE
CHAPTER 21-CIVIL RIGHTS
SUBCHAPTER VI--EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES
§ 2000e-1. Applicability to foreign and religious employment
(a) Inapplicability of subchapter to certain aliens and employees of religious entities
This subchapter shall not apply to an employer with respect to the employment of aliens outside any State,
or to a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment
of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation,
association, educational institution, or society of its activities.
(b) Compliance with statute as violative of foreign law
It shall not be unlawful under section 2000e-2 or 2000e-3 of this title for an employer (or a corporation
controlled by an employer), labor organization, employment agency, or joint labor-management committee
controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining (including on-the-job training programs) to take
any action otherwise prohibited by such section, with respect to an employee in a workplace in a foreign
country if compliance with such section would cause such employer (or such corporation), such
organization, such agency, or such committee to violate the law of the foreign country in which such
workplace is located.
(c) Control of corporation incorporated in foreign country
(1) If an employer controls a corporation whose place of incorporation is a foreign country, any practice
prohibited by section 2000e-2 or 2000e-3 of this title engaged in by such corporation shall be presumed to
be engaged in by such employer.
(2) Sections 2000e-2 and 2000e-3 of this title shall not apply with respect to the foreign operations of an
employer that is a foreign person not controlled by an American employer.
(3) For purposes of this subsection, the determination of whether an employer controls a corporation shall
be based o n (A) the interrelation of operations;
(B) the common management;
(C) the centralized control of labor relations; and
(D) the common ownership or financial control, of the employer and the corporation.
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42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2
UNITED STATES CODE ANNOTATED
TITLE 42. THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE
CHAPTER 21-CIVIL RIGHTS
SUBCHAPTER VI--EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES
§ 2000e-2. Unlawful employment practices

(a) Employer practices
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
(b) Employment agency practices
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employment agency to fail or refuse to refer for
employment, or otherwise to discriminate against, any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin, or to classify or refer for employment any individual on the basis of his race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.
(c) Labor organization practices
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor organization(1) to exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise to discriminate against, any individual
because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify its membership or applicants for membership, or to classify or fail or
refuse to refer for employment any individual, in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities, or would limit such employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee or as an applicant for employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an individual in violation of this
section.
(d) Training programs
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for any employer, labor organization, or joint
labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining, including
on-the-job training programs to discriminate against any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin in admission to, or employment in, any program established to provide apprenticeship or
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other training.
(e) Businesses or enterprises with personnel qualified on basis of religion, sex, or national origin;
educational institutions with personnel of particular religion
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, (1) it shall not be an unlawful employment practice
for an employer to hire and employ employees, for an employment agency to classify, or refer for
employment any individual, for a labor organization to classify its membership or to classify or refer for
employment any individual, or for an employer, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee
controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining programs to admit or employ any individual in any
such program, on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where religion,
sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of that particular business or enterprise, and (2) it shall not be an unlawful employment practice
for a school, college, university, or other educational institution or institution of learning to hire and employ
employees of a particular religion if such school, college, university, or other educational institution or
institution of learning is, in whole or in substantial part, owned, supported, controlled, or managed by a
particular religion or by a particular religious corporation, association, or society, or if the curriculum of
such school, college, university, or other educational institution or institution of learning is directed toward
the propagation of a particular religion.
(f) Members of Communist Party or Communist-action or Communist-front organizations
As used in this subchapter, the phrase "unlawful employment practice" shall not be deemed to include any
action or measure taken by an employer, labor organization, joint labor-management committee, or
employment agency with respect to an individual who is a member of the Communist Party of the United
States or of any other organization required to register as a Communist-action or Communist-front
organization by final order of the Subversive Activities Control Board pursuant to the Subversive Activities
Control Act of 1950 [50 U.S.C.A. § 781 et seq.].
(g) National security
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for
an employer to fail or refuse to hire and employ any individual for any position, for an employer to
discharge any individual from any position, or for an employment agency to fail or refuse to refer any
individual for employment in any position, or for a labor organization to fail or refuse to refer any individual
for employment in any position, if(1) the occupancy of such position, or access to the premises in or upon which any part of the duties of
such position is performed or is to be performed, is subject to any requirement imposed in the interest of
the national security of the United States under any security program in effect pursuant to or administered
under any statute of the United States or any Executive order of the President; and
(2) such individual has not fulfilled or has ceased to fulfill that requirement.
(h) Seniority or merit system; quantity or quality of production; ability tests; compensation based on sex
and authorized by minimum wage provisions
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for
an employer to apply different standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system, or a system which measures earnings by
quantity or quality of production or to employees who work in different locations, provided that such
differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin, nor shall it be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to give and to act upon the
results of any professionally developed ability test provided that such test, its administration or action upon
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the results is not designed, intended or used to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or
national origin. It shall not be an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter for any employer to
differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the amount of the wages or compensation paid or to be
paid to employees of such employer if such differentiation is authorized by the provisions of section 206(d)
of Title 29.
(i) Businesses or enterprises extending preferential treatment to Indians
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall apply to any business or enterprise on or near an Indian
reservation with respect to any publicly announced employment practice of such business or enterprise
under which a preferential treatment is given to any individual because he is an Indian living on or near a
reservation.
(j) Preferential treatment not to be granted on account of existing number or percentage imbalance
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any employer, employment agency,
labor organization, or joint labor-management committee subject to this subchapter to grant preferential
treatment to any individual or to any group because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of
such individual or group on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number or
percentage of persons of any race, color, religion, sex, or national origin employed by any employer,
referred or classified for employment by any employment agency or labor organization, admitted to
membership or classified by any labor organization, or admitted to, or employed in, any apprenticeship or
other training program, in comparison with the total number or percentage of persons of such race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin in any community, State, section, or other area, or in the available work
force in any community, State, section, or other area.
(k) Burden of proof in disparate impact cases
(1)(A) An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is established under this subchapter
only if~
(i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular employment practice that causes
a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin and the respondent fails to
demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with
business necessity; or
(ii) the complaining party makes the demonstration described in subparagraph (C) with respect to an
alternative employment practice and the respondent refuses to adopt such alternative employment
practice.
(B)(i) With respect to demonstrating that a particular employment practice causes a disparate impact as
described in subparagraph (A)(i), the complaining party shall demonstrate that each particular challenged
employment practice causes a disparate impact, except that if the complaining party can demonstrate to
the court that the elements of a respondent's decisionmaking process are not capable of separation for
analysis, the decisionmaking process may be analyzed as one employment practice.
(ii) If the respondent demonstrates that a specific employment practice does not cause the disparate
impact, the respondent shall not be required to demonstrate that such practice is required by business
necessity.
(C) The demonstration referred to by subparagraph (A)(ii) shall be in accordance with the law as it existed
on June 4, 1989, with respect to the concept of "alternative employment practice".
(2) A demonstration that an employment practice is required by business necessity may not be used as a
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defense against a claim of intentional discrimination under this subchapter.
(3) Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, a rule barring the employment of an individual
who currently and knowingly uses or possesses a controlled substance, as defined in schedules I and II of
section 102(6) of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802(6)), other than the use or possession of a
drug taken under the supervision of a licensed health care professional, or any other use or possession
authorized by the Controlled Substances Act [21 U.S.C.A. § 801 et seq.] or any other provision of Federal
law, shall be considered an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter only if such rule is
adopted or applied with an intent to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
(I) Prohibition of discriminatory use of test scores
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a respondent, in connection with the selection or referral of
applicants or candidates for employment or promotion, to adjust the scores of, use different cutoff scores
for, or otherwise alter the results of, employment related tests on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.
(m) Impermissible consideration of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in employment practices
Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, an unlawful employment practice is established when the
complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for
any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.
(n) Resolution of challenges to employment practices implementing litigated or consent judgments or
orders
(1)(A) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, and except as provided in paragraph (2), an
employment practice that implements and is within the scope of a litigated or consent judgment or order
that resolves a claim of employment discrimination under the Constitution or Federal civil rights laws may
not be challenged under the circumstances described in subparagraph (B).
(B) A practice described in subparagraph (A) may not be challenged in a claim under the Constitution or
Federal civil rights laws(i) by a person who, prior to the entry of the judgment or order described in subparagraph (A), had(1) actual notice of the proposed judgment or order sufficient to apprise such person that such judgment or
order might adversely affect the interests and legal rights of such person and that an opportunity was
available to present objections to such judgment or order by a future date certain; and
(II) a reasonable opportunity to present objections to such judgment or order; or
(ii) by a person whose interests were adequately represented by another person who had previously
challenged the judgment or order on the same legal grounds and with a similar factual situation, unless
there has been an intervening change in law or fact.
(2) Nothing in this subsection shall be construed t o (A) alter the standards for intervention under rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or apply to the
rights of parties who have successfully intervened pursuant to such rule in the proceeding in which the
parties intervened;
(B) apply to the rights of parties to the action in which a litigated or consent judgment or order was
entered, or of members of a class represented or sought to be represented in such action, or of members
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of a group on whose behalf relief was sought in such action by the Federal Government;
(C) prevent challenges to a litigated or consent judgment or order on the ground that such judgment or
order was obtained through collusion or fraud, or is transparently invalid or was entered by a court lacking
subject matter jurisdiction; or
(D) authorize or permit the denial to any person of the due process of law required by the Constitution.
(3) Any action not precluded under this subsection that challenges an employment consent judgment or
order described in paragraph (1) shall be brought in the court, and if possible before the judge, that
entered such judgment or order Nothing in this subsection shall preclude a transfer of such action
pursuant to section 1404 of Title 28.
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42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3
UNITED STATES CODE ANNOTATED
TITLE 42. THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE
CHAPTER 21—CIVIL RIGHTS
SUBCHAPTER VI--EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES
§ 2000e-3. Other unlawful employment practices
(a) Discrimination for making charges, testifying, assisting, or participating in enforcement proceedings
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees
or applicants for employment, for an employment agency, or joint labor-management committee
controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining, including on-the-job training programs, to
discriminate against any individual, or for a labor organization to discriminate against any member thereof
or applicant for membership, because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment
practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any
manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.
(b) Printing or publication of notices or advertisements indicating prohibited preference, limitation,
specification, or discrimination; occupational qualification exception
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer, labor organization, employment agency, or
joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining, including
on-the-job training programs, to print or publish or cause to be printed or published any notice or
advertisement relating to employment by such an employer or membership in or any classification or
referral for employment by such a labor organization, or relating to any classification or referral for
employment by such an employment agency, or relating to admission to, or employment in, any program
established to provide apprenticeship or other training by such a joint labor-management committee,
indicating any preference, limitation, specification, or discrimination, based on race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin, except that such a notice or advertisement may indicate a preference, limitation,
specification, or discrimination based on religion, sex, or national origin when religion, sex, or national
origin is a bona fide occupational qualification for employment.
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42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-4

UNITED STATES CODE ANNOTATED
TITLE 42. THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE
CHAPTER 21-CIVIL RIGHTS
SUBCHAPTER VI--EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES
§ 2000e-4. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(a) Creation; composition; political representation; appointment; term; vacancies; Chairman and Vice
Chairman; duties of Chairman; appointment of personnel; compensation of personnel
There is hereby created a Commission to be known as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
which shall be composed of five members, not more than three of whom shall be members of the same
political party. Members of the Commission shall be appointed by the President by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate for a term of five years. Any individual chosen to fill a vacancy shall be appointed
only for the unexpired term of the member whom he shall succeed, and all members of the Commission
shall continue to serve until their successors are appointed and qualified, except that no such member of
the Commission shall continue to serve (1) for more than sixty days when the Congress is in session
unless a nomination to fill such vacancy shall have been submitted to the Senate, or (2) after the
adjournment sine die of the session of the Senate in which such nomination was submitted. The President
shall designate one member to serve as Chairman of the Commission, and one member to serve as Vice
Chairman. The Chairman shall be responsible on behalf of the Commission for the administrative
operations of the Commission, and, except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, shall appoint, in
accordance with the provisions of Title 5 governing appointments in the competitive service, such officers,
agents, attorneys, administrative law judges, and employees as he deems necessary to assist it in the
performance of its functions and to fix their compensation in accordance with the provisions of chapter 51
and subchapter III of chapter 53 of Title 5, relating to classification and General Schedule pay rates:
Provided, That assignment, removal, and compensation of administrative law judges shall be in
accordance with sections 3105, 3344, 5372, and 7521 of Title 5.
(b) General Counsel; appointment; term; duties; representation by attorneys and Attorney General
(1) There shall be a General Counsel of the Commission appointed by the President, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate, for a term of four years. The General Counsel shall have responsibility
for the conduct of litigation as provided in sections 2000e-5 and 2000e-6 of this title. The General Counsel
shall have such other duties as the Commission may prescribe or as may be provided by law and shall
concur with the Chairman of the Commission on the appointment and supervision of regional attorneys.
The General Counsel of the Commission on the effective date of this Act shall continue in such position
and perform the functions specified in this subsection until a successor is appointed and qualified.
(2) Attorneys appointed under this section may, at the direction of the Commission, appear for and
represent the Commission in any case in court, provided that the Attorney General shall conduct all
litigation to which the Commission is a party in the Supreme Court pursuant to this subchapter.
(c) Exercise of powers during vacancy; quorum
A vacancy in the Commission shall not impair the right of the remaining members to exercise all the
powers of the Commission and three members thereof shall constitute a quorum.
(d) Seal; judicial notice
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The Commission shall have an official seal which shall be judicially noticed.
(e) Reports to Congress and the President
The Commission shall at the close of each fiscal year report to the Congress and to the President
concerning the action it has taken and the moneys it has disbursed. It shall make such further reports on
the cause of and means of eliminating discrimination and such recommendations for further legislation as
may appear desirable.
(f) Principal and other offices
The principal office of the Commission shall be in or near the District of Columbia, but it may meet or
exercise any or all its powers at any other place. The Commission may establish such regional or State
offices as it deems necessary to accomplish the purpose of this subchapter.
(g) Powers of Commission
The Commission shall have power(1) to cooperate with and, with their consent, utilize regional, State, local, and other agencies, both public
and private, and individuals;
(2) to pay to witnesses whose depositions are taken or who are summoned before the Commission or any
of its agents the same witness and mileage fees as are paid to witnesses in the courts of the United
States;
(3) to furnish to persons subject to this subchapter such technical assistance as they may request to
further their compliance with this subchapter or an order issued thereunder;
(4) upon the request of (i) any employer, whose employees or some of them, or (ii) any labor organization,
whose members or some of them, refuse or threaten to refuse to cooperate in effectuating the provisions
of this subchapter, to assist in such effectuation by conciliation or such other remedial action as is
provided by this subchapter;
(5) to make such technical studies as are appropriate to effectuate the purposes and policies of this
subchapter and to make the results of such studies available to the public;
(6) to intervene in a civil action brought under section 2000e-5 of this title by an aggrieved party against a
respondent other than a government, governmental agency or political subdivision.
(h) Cooperation with other departments and agencies in performance of educational or promotional
activities; outreach activities
(1) The Commission shall, in any of its educational or promotional activities, cooperate with other
departments and agencies in the performance of such educational and promotional activities.
(2) In exercising its powers under this subchapter, the Commission shall carry out educational and
outreach activities (including dissemination of information in languages other than English) targeted to~
(A) individuals who historically have been victims of employment discrimination and have not been
equitably served by the Commission; and
(B) individuals on whose behalf the Commission has authority to enforce any other law prohibiting
employment discrimination, concerning rights and obligations under this subchapter or such law, as the
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case may be.
(i) Personnel subject to political activity restrictions
All officers, agents, attorneys, and employees of the Commission shall be subject to the provisions of
section 7324 of Title 5, notwithstanding any exemption contained in such section.
(j) Technical Assistance Training Institute
(1) The Commission shall establish a Technical Assistance Training Institute, through which the
Commission shall provide technical assistance and training regarding the laws and regulations enforced
by the Commission.
(2) An employer or other entity covered under this subchapter shall not be excused from compliance with
the requirements of this subchapter because of any failure to receive technical assistance under this
subsection.
(3) There are authorized to be appropriated to carry out this subsection such sums as may be necessary
for fiscal year 1992.
(k) EEOC Education, Technical Assistance, and Training Revolving Fund
(1) There is hereby established in the Treasury of the United States a revolving fund to be known as the
"EEOC Education, Technical Assistance, and Training Revolving Fund" (hereinafter in this subsection
referred to as the "Fund") and to pay the cost (including administrative and personnel expenses) of
providing education, technical assistance, and training relating to laws administered by the Commission.
Monies in the Fund shall be available without fiscal year limitation to the Commission for such purposes.
(2)(A) The Commission shall charge fees in accordance with the provisions of this paragraph to offset the
costs of education, technical assistance, and training provided with monies in the Fund. Such fees for any
education, technical assistance, ortraining(i) shall be imposed on a uniform basis on persons and entities receiving such education, assistance, or
training,
(ii) shall not exceed the cost of providing such education, assistance, and training, and
(iii) with respect to each person or entity receiving such education, assistance, or training, shall bear a
reasonable relationship to the cost of providing such education, assistance, or training to such person or
entity.
(B) Fees received under subparagraph (A) shall be deposited in the Fund by the Commission.
(C) The Commission shall include in each report made under subsection (e) of this section information
with respect to the operation of the Fund, including information, presented in the aggregate, relating to~
(i) the number of persons and entities to which the Commission provided education, technical assistance,
or training with monies in the Fund, in the fiscal year for which such report is prepared,
(ii) the cost to the Commission to provide such education, technical assistance, or training to such persons
and entities, and
(iii) the amount of any fees received by the Commission from such persons and entities for such
education, technical assistance, or training.
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(3) The Secretary of the Treasury shall invest the portion of the Fund not required to satisfy current
expenditures from the Fund, as determined by the Commission, in obligations of the United States or
obligations guaranteed as to principal by the United States. Investment proceeds shall be deposited in the
Fund.
(4) There is hereby transferred to the Fund $1,000,000 from the Salaries and Expenses appropriation of
the Commission.
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42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5

UNITED STATES CODE ANNOTATED
TITLE 42. THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE
CHAPTER 21--CIVIL RIGHTS
SUBCHAPTER VI--EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES
§ 2000e-5. Enforcement provisions

(a) Power of Commission to prevent unlawful employment practices
The Commission is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent any person from engaging in any
unlawful employment practice as set forth in section 2000e-2 or 2000e-3 of this title.
(b) Charges by persons aggrieved or member of Commission of unlawful employment practices by
employers, etc.; filing; allegations; notice to respondent; contents of notice; investigation by Commission;
contents of charges; prohibition on disclosure of charges; determination of reasonable cause; conference,
conciliation, and persuasion for elimination of unlawful practices; prohibition on disclosure of informal
endeavors to end unlawful practices; use of evidence in subsequent proceedings; penalties for disclosure
of information; time for determination of reasonable cause
Whenever a charge is filed by or on behalf of a person claiming to be aggrieved, or by a member of the
Commission, alleging that an employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint
labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining, including
on-the-job training programs, has engaged in an unlawful employment practice, the Commission shall
serve a notice of the charge (including the date, place and circumstances of the alleged unlawful
employment practice) on such employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint
labor-management committee (hereinafter referred to as the "respondent") within ten days, and shall
make an investigation thereof. Charges shall be in writing under oath or affirmation and shall contain such
information and be in such form as the Commission requires. Charges shall not be made public by the
Commission. If the Commission determines after such investigation that there is not reasonable cause to
believe that the charge is true, it shall dismiss the charge and promptly notify the person claiming to be
aggrieved and the respondent of its action. In determining whether reasonable cause exists, the
Commission shall accord substantial weight to final findings and orders made by State or local authorities
in proceedings commenced under State or local law pursuant to the requirements of subsections (c) and
(d) of this section. If the Commission determines after such investigation that there is reasonable cause to
believe that the charge is true, the Commission shall endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful
employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion. Nothing said or
done during and as a part of such informal endeavors may be made public by the Commission, its officers
or employees, or used as evidence in a subsequent proceeding without the written consent of the persons
concerned. Any person who makes public information in violation of this subsection shall be fined not
more than $1,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both. The Commission shall make its
determination on reasonable cause as promptly as possible and, so far as practicable, not later than one
hundred and twenty days from the filing of the charge or, where applicable under subsection (c) or (d) of
this section, from the date upon which the Commission is authorized to take action with respect to the
charge.
(c) State or local enforcement proceedings; notification of State or local authority; time for filing charges
with Commission; commencement of proceedings
In the case of an alleged unlawful employment practice occurring in a State, or political subdivision of a
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State, which has a State or local law prohibiting the unlawful employment practice alleged and establishing
or authorizing a State or local authority to grant or seek relief from such practice or to institute criminal
proceedings with respect thereto upon receiving notice thereof, no charge may be filed under subsection
(a) of this section by the person aggrieved before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been
commenced under the State or local law, unless such proceedings have been earlier terminated, provided
that such sixty-day period shall be extended to one hundred and twenty days during the first year after the
effective date of such State or local law. If any requirement for the commencement of such proceedings is
imposed by a State or local authority other than a requirement of the filing of a written and signed
statement of the facts upon which the proceeding is based, the proceeding shall be deemed to have been
commenced for the purposes of this subsection at the time such statement is sent by registered mail to
the appropriate State or local authority.
(d) State or local enforcement proceedings; notification of State or local authority; time for action on
charges by Commission
In the case of any charge filed by a member of the Commission alleging an unlawful employment practice
occurring in a State or political subdivision of a State which has a State or local law prohibiting the practice
alleged and establishing or authorizing a State or local authority to grant or seek relief from such practice
or to institute criminal proceedings with respect thereto upon receiving notice thereof, the Commission
shall, before taking any action with respect to such charge, notify the appropriate State or local officials
and, upon request, afford them a reasonable time, but not less than sixty days (provided that such
sixty-day period shall be extended to one hundred and twenty days during the first year after the effective
day of such State or local law), unless a shorter period is requested, to act under such State or local law to
remedy the practice alleged.
(e) Time for filing charges; time for service of notice of charge on respondent; filing of charge by
Commission with State or local agency; seniority system
(1) A charge under this section shall be filed within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful
employment practice occurred and notice of the charge (including the date, place and circumstances of
the alleged unlawful employment practice) shall be served upon the person against whom such charge is
made within ten days thereafter, except that in a case of an unlawful employment practice with respect to
which the person aggrieved has initially instituted proceedings with a State or local agency with authority to
grant or seek relief from such practice or to institute criminal proceedings with respect thereto upon
receiving notice thereof, such charge shall be filed by or on behalf of the person aggrieved within three
hundred days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred, or within thirty days after receiving
notice that the State or local agency has terminated the proceedings under the State or local law,
whichever is earlier, and a copy of such charge shall be filed by the Commission with the State or local
agency.
(2) For purposes of this section, an unlawful employment practice occurs, with respect to a seniority
system that has been adopted for an intentionally discriminatory purpose in violation of this subchapter
(whether or not that discriminatory purpose is apparent on the face of the seniority provision), when the
seniority system is adopted, when an individual becomes subject to the seniority system, or when a
person aggrieved is injured by the application of the seniority system or provision of the system.
(f) Civil action by Commission, Attorney General, or person aggrieved; preconditions; procedure;
appointment of attorney; payment of fees, costs, or security; intervention; stay of Federal proceedings;
action for appropriate temporary or preliminary relief pending final disposition of charge; jurisdiction and
venue of United States courts; designation of judge to hear and determine case; assignment of case for
hearing; expedition of case; appointment of master
(1) If within thirty days after a charge is filed with the Commission or within thirty days after expiration of
any period of reference under subsection (c) or (d) of this section, the Commission has been unable to
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secure from the respondent a conciliation agreement acceptable to the Commission, the Commission may
bring a civil action against any respondent not a government, governmental agency, or political subdivision
named in the charge. In the case of a respondent which is a government, governmental agency, or
political subdivision, if the Commission has been unable to secure from the respondent a conciliation
agreement acceptable to the Commission, the Commission shall take no further action and shall refer the
case to the Attorney General who may bring a civil action against such respondent in the appropriate
United States district court. The person or persons aggrieved shall have the right to intervene in a civil
action brought by the Commission or the Attorney General in a case involving a government,
governmental agency, or political subdivision. If a charge filed with the Commission pursuant to
subsection (b) of this section is dismissed by the Commission, or if within one hundred and eighty days
from the filing of such charge or the expiration of any period of reference under subsection (c) or (d) of this
section, whichever is later, the Commission has not filed a civil action under this section or the Attorney
General has not filed a civil action in a case involving a government, governmental agency, or political
subdivision, or the Commission has not entered into a conciliation agreement to which the person
aggrieved is a party, the Commission, or the Attorney General in a case involving a government,
governmental agency, or political subdivision, shall so notify the person aggrieved and within ninety days
after the giving of such notice a civil action may be brought against the respondent named in the charge
(A) by the person claiming to be aggrieved or (B) if such charge was filed by a member of the
Commission, by any person whom the charge alleges was aggrieved by the alleged unlawful employment
practice. Upon application by the complainant and in such circumstances as the court may deem just, the
court may appoint an attorney for such complainant and may authorize the commencement of the action
without the payment of fees, costs, or security. Upon timely application, the court may, in its discretion,
permit the Commission, or the Attorney General in a case involving a government, governmental agency,
or political subdivision, to intervene in such civil action upon certification that the case is of general public
importance. Upon request, the court may, in its discretion, stay further proceedings for not more than sixty
days pending the termination of State or local proceedings described in subsection (c) or (d) of this section
or further efforts of the Commission to obtain voluntary compliance.
(2) Whenever a charge is filed with the Commission and the Commission concludes on the basis of a
preliminary investigation that prompt judicial action is necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act, the
Commission, or the Attorney General in a case involving a government, governmental agency, or political
subdivision, may bring an action for appropriate temporary or preliminary relief pending final disposition of
such charge. Any temporary restraining order or other order granting preliminary or temporary relief shall
be issued in accordance with rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It shall be the duty of a court
having jurisdiction over proceedings under this section to assign cases for hearing at the earliest
practicable date and to cause such cases to be in every way expedited.
(3) Each United States district court and each United States court of a place subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States shall have jurisdiction of actions brought under this subchapter. Such an action may be
brought in any judicial district in the State in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have
been committed, in the judicial district in which the employment records relevant to such practice are
maintained and administered, or in the judicial district in which the aggrieved person would have worked
but for the alleged unlawful employment practice, but if the respondent is not found within any such
district, such an action may be brought within the judicial district in which the respondent has his principal
office. For purposes of sections 1404 and 1406 of Title 28, the judicial district in which the respondent has
his principal office shall in all cases be considered a district in which the action might have been brought
(4) It shall be the duty of the chief judge of the district (or in his absence, the acting chief judge) in which
the case is pending immediately to designate a judge in such district to hear and determine the case. In
the event that no judge in the district is available to hear and determine the case, the chief judge of the
district, or the acting chief judge, as the case may be, shall certify this fact to the chief judge of the circuit
(or in his absence, the acting chief judge) who shall then designate a district or circuit judge of the circuit
to hear and determine the case.
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(5) It shall be the duty of the judge designated pursuant to this subsection to assign the case for hearing at
the earliest practicable date and to cause the case to be in every way expedited. If such judge has not
scheduled the case for trial within one hundred and twenty days after issue has been joined, that judge
may appoint a master pursuant to rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
(g) Injunctions; appropriate affirmative action; equitable relief; accrual of back pay; reduction of back pay;
limitations on judicial orders
(1) If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an
unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the court may enjoin the respondent from
engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate,
which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay
(payable by the employer, employment agency, or labor organization, as the case may be, responsible for
the unlawful employment practice), or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate. Back pay
liability shall not accrue from a date more than two years prior to the filing of a charge with the
Commission. Interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person or persons
discriminated against shall operate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable.
(2)(A) No order of the court shall require the admission or reinstatement of an individual as a member of a
union, or the hiring, reinstatement, or promotion of an individual as an employee, or the payment to him of
any back pay, if such individual was refused admission, suspended, or expelled, or was refused
employment or advancement or was suspended or discharged for any reason other than discrimination on
account of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin or in violation of section 2000e-3(a) of this title.
(B) On a claim in which an individual proves a violation under section 2000e-2(m) of this title and a
respondent demonstrates that the respondent would have taken the same action in the absence of the
impermissible motivating factor, the court(i) may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief (except as provided in clause (ii)), and attorney's fees and
costs demonstrated to be directly attributable only to the pursuit of a claim under section 2000e-2(m) of
this title; and
(ii) shall not award damages or issue an order requiring any admission, reinstatement, hiring, promotion,
or payment, described in subparagraph (A).
(h) Provisions of chapter 6 of Title 29 not applicable to civil actions for prevention of unlawful practices
The provisions of chapter 6 of Title 29 shall not apply with respect to civil actions brought under this
section.
(i) Proceedings by Commission to compel compliance with judicial orders
In any case in which an employer, employment agency, or labor organization fails to comply with an order
of a court issued in a civil action brought under this section, the Commission may commence proceedings
to compel compliance with such order.
(j) Appeals
Any civil action brought under this section and any proceedings brought under subsection (i) of this section
shall be subject to appeal as provided in sections 1291 and 1292, Title 28.
(k) Attorney's fee; liability of Commission and United States for costs
In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing
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party, other than the Commission or the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee (including expert fees)
as part of the costs, and the Commission and the United States shall be liable for costs the same as a
private person.
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42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-6

UNITED STATES CODE ANNOTATED
TITLE 42. THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE
CHAPTER 21--CIVIL RIGHTS
SUBCHAPTER VI-EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES
§ 2000e-6. Civil actions by the Attorney General
(a) Complaint
Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that any person or group of persons is
engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of any of the rights secured by this
subchapter, and that the pattern or practice is of such a nature and is intended to deny the full exercise of
the rights herein described, the Attorney General may bring a civil action in the appropriate district court of
the United States by filing with it a complaint (1) signed by him (or in his absence the Acting Attorney
General), (2) setting forth facts pertaining to such pattern or practice, and (3) requesting such relief,
including an application for a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order or other order against
the person or persons responsible for such pattern or practice, as he deems necessary to insure the full
enjoyment of the rights herein described.
(b) Jurisdiction; three-judge district court for cases of general public importance: hearing, determination,
expedition of action, review by Supreme Court; single judge district court: hearing, determination,
expedition of action
The district courts of the United States shall have and shall exercise jurisdiction of proceedings instituted
pursuant to this section, and in any such proceeding the Attorney General may file with the clerk of such
court a request that a court of three judges be convened to hear and determine the case. Such request by
the Attorney General shall be accompanied by a certificate that, in his opinion, the case is of general
public importance. A copy of the certificate and request for a three-judge court shall be immediately
furnished by such clerk to the chief judge of the circuit (or in his absence, the presiding circuit judge of the
circuit) in which the case is pending. Upon receipt of such request it shall be the duty of the chief judge of
the circuit or the presiding circuit judge, as the case may be, to designate immediately three judges in
such circuit, of whom at least one shall be a circuit judge and another of whom shall be a district judge of
the court in which the proceeding was instituted, to hear and determine such case, and it shall be the duty
of the judges so designated to assign the case for hearing at the earliest practicable date, to participate in
the hearing and determination thereof, and to cause the case to be in every way expedited. An appeal
from the final judgment of such court will lie to the Supreme Court.
In the event the Attorney General fails to file such a request in any such proceeding, it shall be the duty of
the chief judge of the district (or in his absence, the acting chief judge) in which the case is pending
immediately to designate a judge in such district to hear and determine the case. In the event that no
judge in the district is available to hear and determine the case, the chief judge of the district, or the acting
chief judge, as the case may be, shall certify this fact to the chief judge of the circuit (or in his absence,
the acting chief judge) who shall then designate a distnct or circuit judge of the circuit to hear and
determine the case.
It shall be the duty of the judge designated pursuant to this section to assign the case for hearing at the
earliest practicable date and to cause the case to be in every way expedited.
(c) Transfer of functions, etc., to Commission; effective date; prerequisite to transfer; execution of
functions by Commission
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Effective two years after March 24, 1972, the functions of the Attorney General under this section shall be
transferred to the Commission, together with such personnel, property, records, and unexpended
balances of appropriations, allocations, and other funds employed, used, held, available, or to be made
available in connection with such functions unless the President submits, and neither House of Congress
vetoes, a reorganization plan pursuant to chapter 9 of Title 5, inconsistent with the provisions of this
subsection The Commission shall carry out such functions in accordance with subsections (d) and (e) of
this section
(d) Transfer of functions, etc , not to affect suits commenced pursuant to this section prior to date of
transfer
Upon the transfer of functions provided for in subsection (c) of this section, in all suits commenced
pursuant to this section prior to the date of such transfer, proceedings shall continue without abatement,
all court orders and decrees shall remain in effect, and the Commission shall be substituted as a party for
the United States of America, the Attorney General, or the Acting Attorney General, as appropriate
(e) Investigation and action by Commission pursuant to filing of charge of discrimination, procedure
Subsequent to March 24, 1972, the Commission shall have authority to investigate and act on a charge of
a pattern or practice of discrimination, whether filed by or on behalf of a person claiming to be aggrieved
or by a member of the Commission All such actions shall be conducted in accordance with the
procedures set forth in section 2000e-5 of this title
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42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-7

UNITED STATES CODE ANNOTATED
TITLE 42. THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE
CHAPTER 21--CIVIL RIGHTS
SUBCHAPTER VI--EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES
§ 2000e-7. Effect on State laws
Nothing in this subchapter shall be deemed to exempt or relieve any person from any liability, duty,
penalty, or punishment provided by any present or future law of any State or political subdivision of a
State, other than any such law which purports to require or permit the doing of any act which would be an
unlawful employment practice under this subchapter.
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42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-8

UNITED STATES CODE ANNOTATED
TITLE 42. THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE
CHAPTER 21-CIVIL RIGHTS
SUBCHAPTER VI--EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES
§ 2000e-8. Investigations
(a) Examination and copying of evidence related to unlawful employment practices
In connection with any investigation of a charge filed under section 2000e-5 of this title, the Commis ion 01
its designated representative shall at all reasonable times have access to, for the purposes of
examination, and the right to copy any evidence of any person being investigated or proceeded against
that relates to unlawful employment practices covered by this subchapter and is relevant to the charge
under investigation.
(b) Cooperation with State and local agencies administering State fair employment practices laws;
participation in and contribution to research and other projects; utilization of services; payment in advance
or reimbursement; agreements and rescission of agreements
The Commission may cooperate with State and local agencies charged with the administration of State
fair employment practices laws and, with the consent of such agencies, may, for the purpose of carrying
out its functions and duties under this subchapter and within the limitation of funds appropriated
specifically for such purpose, engage in and contribute to the cost of research and other projects of mutual
interest undertaken by such agencies, and utilize the services of such agencies and their employees, and,
notwithstanding any other provision of law, pay by advance or reimbursement such agencies and their
employees for services rendered to assist the Commission in carrying out this subchapter. In furtherance
of such cooperative efforts, the Commission may enter into written agreements with such State or local
agencies and such agreements may include provisions under which the Commission shall refrain from
processing a charge in any cases or class of cases specified in such agreements or under which the
Commission shall relieve any person or class of persons in such State or locality from requirements
imposed under this section. The Commission shall rescind any such agreement whenever it determines
that the agreement no longer serves the interest of effective enforcement of this subchapter.
(c) Execution, retention, and preservation of records; reports to Commission; training program records;
appropriate relief from regulation or order for undue hardship; procedure for exemption, judicial action to
compel compliance
Every employer, employment agency, and labor organization subject to this subchapter shall (1) make and
keep such records relevant to the determinations of whether unlawful employment practices have been or
are being committed, (2) preserve such records for such periods, and (3) make such reports therefrom as
the Commission shall prescribe by regulation or order, after public hearing, as reasonable, necessary, or
appropriate for the enforcement of this subchapter or the regulations or orders thereunder. The
Commission shall, by regulation, require each employer, labor organization, and joint labor-management
committee subject to this subchapter which controls an apprenticeship or other training program to
maintain such records as are reasonably necessary to carry out the purposes of this subchapter,
including, but not limited to, a list of applicants who wish to participate in such program, including the
chronological order in which applications were received, and to furnish to the Commission upon request, a
detailed description of the manner in which persons are selected to participate in the apprenticeship or
other training program. Any employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management
committee which believes that the application to it of any regulation or order issued under this section
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would result in undue hardship may apply to the Commission for an exemption from the application of
such regulation or order, and, if such application for an exemption is denied, bring a civil action in the
United States district court for the district where such records are kept. If the Commission or the court, as
the case may be, finds that the application of the regulation or order to the employer, employment agency,
or labor organization in question would impose an undue hardship, the Commission or the court, as the
case may be, may grant appropriate relief. If any person required to comply with the provisions of this
subsection fails or refuses to do so, the United States district court for the district in which such person is
found, resides, or transacts business, shall, upon application of the Commission, or the Attorney General
in a case involving a government, governmental agency or political subdivision, have jurisdiction to issue
to such person an order requiring him to comply.
(d) Consultation and coordination between Commission and interested State and Federal agencies in
prescribing recordkeeping and reporting requirements; availability of information furnished pursuant to
recordkeeping and reporting requirements; conditions on availability
In prescribing requirements pursuant to subsection (c) of this section, the Commission shall consult with
other interested State and Federal agencies and shall endeavor to coordinate its requirements with those
adopted by such agencies. The Commission shall furnish upon request and without cost to any State or
local agency charged with the administration of a fair employment practice law information obtained
pursuant to subsection (c) of this section from any employer, employment agency, labor organization, or
joint labor-management committee subject to the jurisdiction of such agency. Such information shall be
furnished on condition that it not be made public by the recipient agency prior to the institution of a
proceeding under State or local law involving such information. If this condition is violated by a recipient
agency, the Commission may decline to honor subsequent requests pursuant to this subsection.
(e) Prohibited disclosures; penalties
It shall be unlawful for any officer or employee of the Commission to make public in any manner whatever
any information obtained by the Commission pursuant to its authority under this section prior to the
institution of any proceeding under this subchapter involving such information. Any officer or employee of
the Commission who shall make public in any manner whatever any information in violation of this
subsection shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than
$1,000, or imprisoned not more than one year.
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42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-9

UNITED STATES CODE ANNOTATED
TITLE 42. THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE
CHAPTER 21-CIVIL RIGHTS
SUBCHAPTER VI--EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES
§ 2000e-9. Conduct of hearings and investigations pursuant to section 161 of Title 29
For the purpose of all hearings and investigations conducted by the Commission or its duly authorized
agents or agencies, section 161 of Title 29 shall apply.
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42U.S.C.A. §2000e-10

UNITED STATES CODE ANNOTATED
TITLE 42 THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE
CHAPTER 21--CIVIL RIGHTS
SUBCHAPTER VI--EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES
§ 2000e-10. Posting of notices; penalties
(a) Every employer, employment agency, and labor organization, as the case may be, shall post and keep
posted in conspicuous places upon its premises where notices to employees, applicants for employment,
and members are customarily posted a notice to be prepared or approved by the Commission setting forth
excerpts from or, summaries of, the pertinent provisions of this subchapter and information pertinent to
the filing of a complaint.
(b) A willful violation of this section shall be punishable by a fine of not more than $100 for each separate
offense.
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42U.S.C.A. §2000e-11

UNITED STATES CODE ANNOTATED
TITLE 42. THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE
CHAPTER 2 1 - C M L RIGHTS
SUBCHAPTER VI-EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES
§ 2000e-11. Veterans' special rights or preference
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be construed to repeal or modify any Federal, State, territorial,
or local law creating special rights or preference for veterans.
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42U.S.C.A. §2000e-12

UNITED STATES CODE ANNOTATED
TITLE 42 THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE
CHAPTER 21--CIVIL RIGHTS
SUBCHAPTER VI--EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES
§ 2000e-12 Regulations, conformity of regulations with administrative procedure provisions, reliance on
interpretations and instructions of Commission
(a) The Commission shall have authority from time to time to issue, amend, or rescind suitable procedural
regulations to carry out the provisions of this subchapter Regulations issued under this section shall be in
conformity with the standards and limitations of subchapter II of chapter 5 of Title 5
(b) In any action or proceeding based on any alleged unlawful employment practice, no person shall be
subject to any liability or punishment for or on account of (1) the commission by such person of an
unlawful employment practice if he pleads and proves that the act or omission complained of was in good
faith, in conformity with, and in reliance on any written interpretation or opinion of the Commission, or (2)
the failure of such person to publish and file any information required by any provision of this subchapter if
he pleads and proves that he failed to publish and file such information in good faith, in conformity with the
instructions of the Commission issued under this subchapter regarding the filing of such information Such
a defense, if established, shall be a bar to the action or proceeding notwithstanding that (A) after such act
or omission, such interpretation or opinion is modified or rescinded or is determined by judicial authority to
be invalid or of no legal effect, or (B) after publishing or filing the description and annual reports, such
publication or filing is determined by judicial authority not to be in conformity with the requirements of this
subchapter
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42U.S.C.A. §2000e-13

UNITED STATES CODE ANNOTATED
TITLE 42. THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE
CHAPTER 21—CIVIL RIGHTS
SUBCHAPTER VI--EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES
§ 2000e-13. Application to personnel of Commission of sections 111 and 1114 of Title 18; punishment for
violation of section 1114 of Title 18
The provisions of sections 111 and 1114, Title 18, shall apply to officers, agents, and employees of the
Commission in the performance of their official duties. Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 111 and
1114 of Title 18, whoever in violation of the provisions of section 1114 of such title kills a person while
engaged in or on account of the performance of his official functions under this Act shall be punished by
imprisonment for any term of years or for life.
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42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-14

UNITED STATES CODE ANNOTATED
TITLE 42. THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE
CHAPTER 21--CIVIL RIGHTS
SUBCHAPTER VI--EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES
§ 2000e-14. Equal Employment Opportunity Coordinating Council; establishment; composition; duties;
report to President and Congress
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission shall have the responsibility for developing and
implementing agreements, policies and practices designed to maximize effort, promote efficiency, and
eliminate conflict, competition, duplication and inconsistency among the operations, functions and
jurisdictions of the various departments, agencies and branches of the Federal Government responsible
for the implementation and enforcement of equal employment opportunity legislation, orders, and policies.
On or before October 1 of each year, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission shall transmit to the
President and to the Congress a report of its activities, together with such recommendations for legislative
or administrative changes as it concludes are desirable to further promote the purposes of this section.
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42U.S.C.A. §2000e-15

UNITED STATES CODE ANNOTATED
TITLE 42 THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE
CHAPTER 21--CIVIL RIGHTS
SUBCHAPTER VI--EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES
§ 2000e-15 Presidential conferences, acquaintance of leadership with provisions for employment rights
and obligations, plans for fair administration, membership
The President shall, as soon as feasible after July 2, 1964, convene one or more conferences for the
purpose of enabling the leaders of groups whose members will be affected by this subchapter to become
familiar with the rights afforded and obligations imposed by its provisions, and for the purpose of making
plans which will result in the fair and effective administration of this subchapter when all of its provisions
become effective The President shall invite the participation in such conference or conferences of (1) the
members of the President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity, (2) the members of the
Commission on Civil Rights, (3) representatives of State and local agencies engaged in furthering equal
employment opportunity, (4) representatives of private agencies engaged in furthering equal employment
opportunity, and (5) representatives of employers, labor organizations and employment agencies who will
be subject to this subchapter
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42U.S.C.A. §2000e-16

UNITED STATES CODE ANNOTATED
TITLE 42 THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE
CHAPTER 21--CML RIGHTS
SUBCHAPTER VI--EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES
§ 2000e-16 Employment by Federal Government
(a) Discriminatory practices prohibited, employees or applicants for employment subject to coverage
All personnel actions affecting employees or applicants for employment (except with regard to aliens
employed outside the limits of the United States) in military departments as defined in section 102 of Title
5, in executive agencies as defined in section 105 of Title 5 (including employees and applicants for
employment who are paid from nonappropriated funds), in the United States Postal Service and the Postal
Rate Commission, in those units of the Government of the District of Columbia having positions in the
competitive service, and in those units of the judicial branch of the Federal Government having positions
in the competitive service, in the Smithsonian Institution, and in the Government Printing Office, the
Government Accountability Office, and the Library of Congress shall be made free from any discrimination
based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
(b) Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, enforcement powers, issuance of rules, regulations, etc ,
annual review and approval of national and regional equal employment opportunity plans, review and
evaluation of equal employment opportunity programs and publication of progress reports, consultations
with interested parties, compliance with rules, regulations, etc , contents of national and regional equal
employment opportunity plans, authority of Librarian of Congress
Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission shall
have authority to enforce the provisions of subsection (a) of this section through appropriate remedies,
including reinstatement or hiring of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of
this section, and shall issue such rules, regulations, orders and instructions as it deems necessary and
appropriate to carry out its responsibilities under this section The Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission shall—
(1) be responsible for the annual review and approval of a national and regional equal employment
opportunity plan which each department and agency and each appropriate unit referred to in subsection
(a) of this section shall submit in order to maintain an affirmative program of equal employment
opportunity for all such employees and applicants for employment,
(2) be responsible for the review and evaluation of the operation of all agency equal employment
opportunity programs, periodically obtaining and publishing (on at least a semiannual basis) progress
reports from each such department, agency, or unit, and
(3) consult with and solicit the recommendations of interested individuals, groups, and organizations
relating to equal employment opportunity
The head of each such department, agency, or unit shall comply with such rules, regulations, orders, and
instructions which shall include a provision that an employee or applicant for employment shall be notified
of any final action taken on any complaint of discrimination filed by him thereunder The plan submitted by
each department, agency, and unit shall include, but not be limited to~
(1) provision for the establishment of training and education programs designed to provide a maximum
opportunity for employees to advance so as to perform at their highest potential, and
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(2) a description of the qualifications in terms of training and experience relating to equal employment
opportunity for the principal and operating officials of each such department, agency, or unit responsible
for carrying out the equal employment opportunity program and of the allocation of personnel and
resources proposed by such department, agency, or unit to carry out its equal employment opportunity
program
With respect to employment in the Library of Congress, authorities granted in this subsection to the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission shall be exercised by the Librarian of Congress
(c) Civil action by employee or applicant for employment for redress of grievances, time for bringing of
action, head of department, agency, or unit as defendant
Within 90 days of receipt of notice of final action taken by a department, agency, or unit referred to in
subsection (a) of this section, or by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission upon an appeal from
a decision or order of such department, agency, or unit on a complaint of discrimination based on race,
color, religion, sex or national origin, brought pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, Executive Order
11478 or any succeeding Executive orders, or after one hundred and eighty days from the filing of the
initial charge with the department, agency, or unit or with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
on appeal from a decision or order of such department, agency, or unit until such time as final action may
be taken by a department, agency, or unit, an employee or applicant for employment, if aggrieved by the
final disposition of his complaint or by the failure to take final action on his complaint, may file a civil
action as provided in section 2000e-5 of this title, in which civil action the head of the department, agency,
or unit, as appropriate, shall be the defendant
(d) Section 2000e-5(f) through (k) of this title applicable to civil actions
The provisions of section 2000e-5(f) through (k) of this title, as applicable, shall govern civil actions
brought hereunder, and the same interest to compensate for delay in payment shall be available as in
cases involving nonpublic parties
(e) Government agency or official not relieved of responsibility to assure nondiscrimination in employment
or equal employment opportunity
Nothing contained in this Act shall relieve any Government agency or official of its or his primary
responsibility to assure nondiscrimination in employment as required by the Constitution and statutes or of
its or his responsibilities under Executive Order 11478 relating to equal employment opportunity in the
Federal Government
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42U.S.C.A. §2000e-16a

UNITED STATES CODE ANNOTATED
TITLE 42 THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE
CHAPTER 21-CIVIL RIGHTS
SUBCHAPTER VI--EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES
§2000e-16a Short title, purpose, definition
(a) Short title
Sections 2000e-16a to 2000e-16c of this title may be cited as the "Government Employee Rights Act of
1991"
(b) Purpose
The purpose of sections 2000e-16a to 2000e-16c of this title is to provide procedures to protect the rights
of certain government employees, with respect to their public employment, to be free of discrimination on
the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, or disability
(c) "Violation" defined
For purposes of sections 2000e-16a to 2000e-16c of this title, the term "violation" means a practice that
violates section 2000e-16b(a) of this title
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42U.S.C.A. §2000e-16b

UNITED STATES CODE ANNOTATED
TITLE 42 THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE
CHAPTER 21—CIVIL RIGHTS
SUBCHAPTER VI-EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES
§ 2000e-16b Discriminatory practices prohibited
(a) Practices
All personnel actions affecting the Presidential appointees described in section 1219 of Title 2 or the State
employees described in section 2000e-16c of this title shall be made free from any discrimination based
on(1) race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, within the meaning of section 2000e-16 of this title,
(2) age, within the meaning of section 633a of Title 29, or
(3) disability, within the meaning of section 791 of Title 29 and sections 12112 to 12114 of this title
(b) Remedies
The remedies referred to in sections 1219(a)(1) of Title 2 and 2000e-16c(a) of this title—
(1) may include, in the case of a determination that a violation of subsection (a)(1) or (a)(3) of this section
has occurred, such remedies as would be appropriate if awarded under sections 2000e-5(g), 2000e-5(k),
and 2000e-16(d) of this title, and such compensatory damages as would be appropriate if awarded under
section 1981 or sections 1981a(a)and 1981 a(b)(2) of this title,
(2) may include, in the case of a determination that a violation of subsection (a)(2) of this section has
occurred, such remedies as would be appropriate if awarded under section 633a(c) of Title 29, and
(3) may not include punitive damages
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42U.S.C.A. §2000e-16c

UNITED STATES CODE ANNOTATED
TITLE 42 THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE
CHAPTER 21--CIVIL RIGHTS
SUBCHAPTER VI--EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES
§ 2000e-16c Coverage of previously exempt State employees
(a) Application
The rights, protections, and remedies provided pursuant to section 2000e-16b of this title shall apply with
respect to employment of any individual chosen or appointed, by a person elected to public office in any
State or political subdivision of any State by the qualified voters thereof(1) to be a member of the elected official's personal staff,
(2) to serve the elected official on the policymaking level, or
(3) to serve the elected official as an immediate advisor with respect to the exercise of the constitutional or
legal powers of the office
(b) Enforcement by administrative action
(1) In general
Any individual referred to in subsection (a) of this section may file a complaint alleging a violation, not later
than 180 days after the occurrence of the alleged violation, with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, which, in accordance with the principles and procedures set forth in sections 554 through
557 of Title 5, shall determine whether a violation has occurred and shall set forth its determination in a
final order If the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission determines that a violation has occurred,
the final order shall also provide for appropriate relief
(2) Referral to State and local authorities
(A) Application
Section 2000e-5(d) of this title shall apply with respect to any proceeding under this section
(B) Definition
For purposes of the application described in subparagraph (A), the term "any charge filed by a member of
the Commission alleging an unlawful employment practice" means a complaint filed under this section
(c) Judicial review
Any party aggrieved by a final order under subsection (b) of this section may obtain a review of such order
under chapter 158 of Title 28 For the purpose of this review, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission shall be an "agency" as that term is used in chapter 158 of Title 28
(d) Standard of review
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant
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questions of law and interpret constitutional and statutory provisions The court shall set aside a final order
under subsection (b) of this section if it is determined that the order was(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not consistent with law,
(2) not made consistent with required procedures, or
(3) unsupported by substantial evidence
In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall review the whole record or those parts of it cited by
a party, and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error
(e) Attorney's fees
If the individual referred to in subsection (a) of this section is the prevailing party in a proceeding under this
subsection [FN1] attorney's fees may be allowed by the court in accordance with the standards
prescribed under section 2000e-5(k) of this title
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42U.S.C.A. §2000e-17

UNITED STATES CODE ANNOTATED
TITLE 42. THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE
CHAPTER 21—CIVIL RIGHTS
SUBCHAPTER VI-EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES
§ 2000e-17. Procedure for denial, withholding, termination, or suspension of Government contract
subsequent to acceptance by Government of affirmative action plan of employer; time of acceptance of
plan
No Government contract, or portion thereof, with any employer, shall be denied, withheld, terminated, or
suspended, by any agency or officer of the United States under any equal employment opportunity law or
order, where such employer has an affirmative action plan which has previously been accepted by the
Government for the same facility within the past twelve months without first according such employer full
hearing and adjudication under the provisions of section 554 of Title 5, and the following pertinent
sections: Provided, That if such employer has deviated substantially from such previously agreed to
affirmative action plan, this section shall not apply: Provided further, That for the purposes of this section
an affirmative action plan shall be deemed to have been accepted by the Government at the time the
appropriate compliance agency has accepted such plan unless within forty-five days thereafter the Office
of Federal Contract Compliance has disapproved such plan.
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ADDENDUM 3

ADDENDUM 3

42 U.S.CA § 1981

UNITED STATES CODE ANNOTATED
TITLE 42. THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE
CHAPTER 21--CIVIL RIGHTS
SUBCHAPTER I--GENERALLY
§ 1981. Equal rights under the law

(a) Statement of equal rights
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every
State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence,
and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons
and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment,
pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.

(b) "Make and enforce contracts" defined

For purposes of this section, the term "make and enforce contracts" includes the
making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of
all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.

(c) Protection against impairment
The rights protected by this section are protected against impairment by
nongovernmental discrimination and impairment under color of State law.

ADDENDUM 4

ADDENDUM 4
UTAH LABOR CODE

34A-5-106. Discriminatory or prohibited employment practices - Permitted
practices.
(1) It is a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice to take any
action described in Subsections (1)(a) through (f).
(a) (i) An employer may not refuse to hire, promote, discharge,
demote, or terminate any person, or to retaliate against, harass, or
discriminate in matters of compensation or in terms, privileges, and
conditions of employment against any person otherwise qualified,
because of:
(A) race;
(B) color;
(C) sex;
(D) pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions;
(E) age, if the individual is 40 years of age or older;
(F) religion;
(G) national origin; or
(H) disability.
(ii) A person may not be considered "otherwise
qualified," unless that person possesses the following
required by an employer for any particular job, job
classification, or position:
(A) education;
(B) training;
(C) ability, with or without reasonable accommodation;
(D) moral character;
(E) integrity;
(F) disposition to work;
(G) adherence to reasonable rules and regulations; and
(H) other job related qualifications required by an employer.
(iii)
(A) As used in this chapter, "to discriminate in
matters of compensation" means the payment of differing
wages or salaries to employees having substantially equal
experience, responsibilities, and skill for the particular job.
(B) Notwithstanding Subsection (1)(a)(iii)(A):
1 of 8

(I) nothing in this chapter prevents increases in
pay as a result of longevity with the employer, if the
salary increases are uniformly applied and available
to all employees on a substantially proportional basis;
and
(II) nothing in this section prohibits an
employer and employee from agreeing to a rate of
pay or work schedule designed to protect the
employee from loss of Social Security payment or
benefits if the employee is eligible for those
payments.
(b) An employment agency may not:
(i) refuse to list and properly classify for employment,
or refuse to refer an individual for employment, in a known
available job for which the individual is otherwise qualified,
because of:
(A) race;
(B) color;
(C) sex;
(D) pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related
conditions;
(E) religion;
(F) national origin; or
(G) age, if the individual is 40 years of age or
older; or
(H) disability; or
(ii) comply with a request from an employer for referral of
applicants for employment if the request indicates either directly
indirectly that the employer discriminates in employment on
account of:
(A) race;
(B) color;
(C) sex;
(D) pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related
conditions;
(E) religion;
(F) national origin; or
(G) age, if the individual is 40 years of age or
older; or

(H) disability; or
(c) A labor organization may not exclude any individual
otherwise qualified from full membership rights in the labor
organization, expel the individual from membership in the labor
organization, or otherwise discriminate against or harass any of the
labor organization's members in full employment of work
opportunity, or representation, because of:
(i) race;
(ii) sex;
(iii) pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related
conditions;
(iv) religion;
(v) national origin;
(vi) age, if the individual is 40 years of age or older; or
(vii) disability.
(d) Unless based upon a bona fide occupational
qualification, or required by and given to an agency of government
for security reasons, an employer, employment agency, or labor
organization may not print, or circulate, or cause to be printed or
circulated, any statement, advertisement, or publication, use any
form of application for employment or membership, or make any
inquiry in connection with prospective employment or membership
that expresses, either directly or indirectly:
(i) any limitation, specification, or discrimination as to:
(A) race;
(B) color;
(C) sex;
(D) pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related
conditions;
(E) religion;
(F) national origin; or
(G) age, if the individual is 40 years of age or
older; or
(H) disability
(ii) the intent to make any limitation, specification, or
discrimination described in Subsection (1)(d)(i).
(e) A person, whether or not an employer, an employment
agency, a labor organization, or the employees or members of an

employer, employment agency, or labor organization, may not:
(i) aid, incite, compel, or coerce the doing of an act
defined in this section to be a discriminatory or prohibited
employment practice;
(ii) obstruct or prevent any person from complying
with this chapter, or any order issued under this chapter; or
(iii) attempt, either directly or indirectly, to commit any
act prohibited in this section.
(f)
(i) An employer, labor organization, joint
apprenticeship committee, or vocational school, providing,
coordinating, or controlling apprenticeship programs, or
providing, coordinating, or controlling on-the-job-training
programs, instruction, training, or retraining programs may
not:
(A) deny to, or withhold from, any qualified
person, the right to be admitted to, or participate in
any apprenticeship training program,
on-the-job-training program, or other occupational
instruction, training or retraining program because of:
(I) race;
(II) color;
(III) sex;
(IV) pregnancy, childbirth, or
pregnancy-related conditions;
(V) religion;
(VI) national origin;
(VII) age, if the individual is 40 years of
age or older; or
(VIII) disability;
(B) discriminate against or harass any qualified
person in that person's pursuit of programs described
in Subsection (1)(f)(i)(A), or to discriminate against
such a person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of
programs described in Subsection (1)(f)(i)(A),
because of:
(I) race;
(II) color;

(III) sex;
(IV) pregnancy, childbirth, or
pregnancy-related conditions;
(V) religion;
(VI) national origin;
(VII) age, if the individual is 40 years of
age or older; or
(VIII) disability;
(C) except as provided in Subsection (1)(f)(ii),
print, publish, or cause to be printed or published, any
notice or advertisement relating to employment by the
employer, or membership in or any classification or
referral for employment by a labor organization, or
relating to any classification or referral for
employment by an employment agency, indicating
any preference, limitation, specification, or
discrimination based on:
(I) race;
(II) color;
(III) sex;
(IV) pregnancy, childbirth, or
pregnancy-related conditions;
(V) religion;
(VI) national origin;
(VII) age, if the individual is 40 years of
age or older; or
(VIII) disability;
(ii) Notwithstanding Subsection (1)(f)(i)(C), if the
following is a bona fide occupational qualification for
employment, a notice or advertisement described in
Subsection (1)(f)(i)(C) may indicate a preference, limitation,
specification, or discrimination based on:
(A) race;
(B) color;
(C) sex;
(D) pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related
conditions;
(E) religion;
(F) national origin; or
(G) age, if the individual is 40 years of age or
older; or

(H) disability
(2) Nothing contained in Subsections (1)(a) through (1)(f) shall be
construed to prevent
(a) the termination of employment of an individual who, with
or without reasonable accommodation, is physically, mentally, or
emotionally unable to perform the duties required by that
individual's employment,
(b) the variance of insurance premiums or coverage on
account of age,or
(c) a restriction on the activities of individuals licensed by the
liquor authority with respect to persons under 21 years of age
(3) (a) It is not a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice
(i) for an employer to hire and employ employees, for an
employment agency to classify or refer for employment any
individual, for a labor organization to classify its membership or to
classify or refer for employment any individual or for an employer,
labor organization, or joint labor-management committee controlling
apprenticeship or other training or retraining programs to admit or
employ any individual in any such program, on the basis of religion,
sex, pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions, age,
national origin, or disability in those certain instances where
religion, sex, pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related
conditions, age, if the individual is 40 years of age or older, national
origin, or disability is a bona fide occupational qualification
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular
business or enterprise,
(u) for a school, college, university, or other educational
institution to hire and employ employees of a particular religion if
(A) the school, college, university, or other
educational institution is, in whole or in substantial part,
owned, supported, controlled, or managed by a particular
religious corporation, association, or society, or
(B) the curriculum of the school, college, university, or
other educational institution is directed toward the
propagation of a particular religion,
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(iii) for an employer to give preference in employment to:
(A) the employer's:
(I) spouse;
(II) child; or
(III) son-in-law or daughter-in-law;
(B) any person for whom the employer is or would be
liable to furnish financial support if those persons were
unemployed;
(C) any person to whom the employer during the
preceding six months has furnished more than one-half of
total financial support regardless of whether or not the
employer was or is legally obligated to furnish support; or
(D) any person whose education or training was
substantially financed by the employer for a period of two
years or more.
(b) Nothing in this chapter applies to any business or
enterprise on or near an Indian reservation with respect to any
publicly announced employment practice of the business or
enterprise under which preferential treatment is given to any
individual because that individual is a native American Indian living
on or near an Indian reservation.
(c) Nothing in this chapter shall be interpreted to require any
employer, employment agency, labor organization, vocational
school, joint labor-management committee, or apprenticeship
program subject to this chapter to grant preferential treatment to
any individual or to any group because of the race, color, religion,
sex, age, national origin, or disability of the individual or group on
account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total
number or percentage of persons of any race, color, religion, sex,
age, national origin, or disability employed by any employer,
referred or classified for employment by an employment agency or
labor organization, admitted to membership or classified by any
labor organization, or admitted to or employed in, any
apprenticeship or other training program, in comparison with the
total number or percentage of persons of that race, color, religion,
sex, age, national origin, or disability in any community or county or
in the available work force in any community or county.

